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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

J. LOWELL PLATT, dba
CRYSTAL POOLS, INC.,
Plaintiff a.nd Resp·ondent,
Case
No. 9238

-vs.C. L. LOCKE,
Defendant ood Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between the pretrial of May 13, 1959, in this matter
and the trial herein, and at the suggestion of the trial
court, appellant submitted to respondent a communication dated September 25, 1959, containing eighteen proposed stipulations of fact. At the commencement of the
trial the original of said letter was received by the court
and filed (R. 122). This is the letter referred to by the court
at the beginning of the trial (R. 29). It is necessary to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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refer to the said proposed propositions to make sense of
the judicial admissions of respondent.
The formal judicial admissions of fact of respondent
are as follows:
1. That on or about April 1, 1958, the administrator
acting under the direction and supervision of Commission of Business Regulation, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-23-5 (10), Laws of Utah 1957, had
classified contractors building swimming pools into a
specialty classification of contractors requiring a specialty contractors' license. That such classification was
made and was effective prior to the first day of April,
1958. (R.29,30,120)
2. That on or before the 1st day of April, 1958, the
plaintiff was engaged in the business of planning and
building swimming pools. (R. 30, 120)
3. That before Aprill, 1958, the defendant was contacted by one Mr. Murdock, who represented that he was
a sales agent for Crystal Pools, Inc., and the defendant
and Murdock negotiated concerning the design and construction of a commercial pool. That on or about Aprill,
1958, the defendant Locke did sign the purported agreement as shown by Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's
complaint. (R. 30, 31, 120)
4. That a dispute arose between defendant and plaintiff concerning whether -or not plaintiff was required to
put in the water and gas lines; plaintiff refused and defendant stopped the work on the pool. (R. 31, 121)
2
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That on or about April 1, 1958, a builder's contracting license had been issued to the plaintiff as an individual (R. 32, 121)
tJ.

6. That on or about April 1, 1958, no specialty contractor's license had been issued to plaintiff. (R. 32, 121)
7. That on or about April1, 1958, there was no such
corporation in existence by the name of Crystal Pools,
Inc. ( R. 32, 121)
8. That on or about April 1, 1958, no contractor's
license of any kind had been issued to any such entity by
the name of Crystal Pools, Inc., nor had any contractor's
license of any kind been issued in the name of Crystal
Pools, Inc. (R. 32, 121)
9. That on or about April 1, 1958, the plaintiff had
filed no affidavit with the County Clerk of Salt Lake
County of doing business under an assumed name.
(R. 32, 121)
10. That Mr. Joe Lamb is one of the persons in this
area who is most experineced in the design and construction of swimming pools. (R. 34, 122)
In addition to the foregoing judicial admissions or
stipulated facts we find in the record that the respondent
intended to incorporate but failed to do so (R. 18, 22),
and that he executed the contract (Ex. P-1) in a representative capacity, i. e., ''Crystal Pools, Inc., by J. Lowell
Platt. (R. 19)
It is significant in appellant's statement of facts that
on 1\fay 13, 1958 (almost one and one-half months after the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contract in question had been executed) respondent applied for and received a specialty license to engage in the
business activity of planning and constructing swimming
pools.
It is further significant in appellant's statement of
facts that the only expert witness, Joe Lamb, testified that
experience and skill are necessary to this occupation (R.
48, 49); also that the record shows that appellant relied
upon the fact that he was doing business with a proper
and qualified corporate entity, Crystal Pools, Inc. (R.
52), and such is admitted to be false. (R. 32, 121)
On other factual issues on which there is disputed
and contrary substantial evidence, appellant realizes that
the trial court's finding (if such exist) are binding on
this Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT A PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND LICENSED SPECIALTY CONTRACTOR AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
PoiNT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION
OF APPELLANT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DE4
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FENDANT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN AND GRANT A
NEW TRIAL.
PoiNT

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

V.
RESPONDENT WAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER
AN ASSUMED NAME AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AND RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED
CONTRACT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
PoiNT

PoiNT

VI.

AS THE CASE RESTED RESPONDENT FAILED
TO PROVE ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED THE
CONTRACT WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AS AN
AGENT FOR A NON-EXISTENT PRINCIPAL.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT A PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND LICENSED SPECIALTY CONTRACTOR AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
PoiNT

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION
OF APPELLANT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN AND GRANT A
NEW TRIAL.
The Legislature of the State of Utah, by the Laws of
1957, passed the following laws of the State of Utah:
'' 58-23-5. ADMINISTRATOR-POWERS AND DuTIES
-EMPLOYEES - SEAL - MEETINGS - The administrator, acting under the direction and supervision
of the commission of business regulation, and with
the advice and counsel of the advisory board, is
hereby charged with the responsibility of administering this act, and for that purpose the administrator shall have the following powers and duties:

*
*
* *
*
'' ( 10) To classify specialty contractors into
separate classifications common in the trade and
license each classification separately.''
''58-23-9. LICENSES- CLASSES- (1) Licenses
issued under the provisions of this act shall be of
the following classes :

*

*

*
*
*
''(b) GENERAL BuiLDING CoNTRACToR's LICENSE. A general building contractor is a contractor whose principal contracting business is in
connection with any structure built, being built, or
to be built for the support, shelter and enclosure of
persons, animals, chattels or movable property of
any kind requiring in its construction the use
of more than two unrelated building trades or
crafts or to do or superintend the whole or any
part thereof, but does not include anyone who

6
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merely furnishes materials or supplies without
fabricating them into or consuming them in the
performance of the work of the general building
contractor.
'' (c) SPECIALTY CoNTRACTOR's LicENSE. A specialty contractor is a contractor whose operations
as such are the performance of construction work
requiring special skill and whose principal contracting business involves the use of specialized
building trades or crafts. The administrator shall
classify specialty contractors into such classifications as are common in the trade and a separate
license shall be required for each such classification of specialty contractor.

*

*

*

*

"(3) Nothing in this act shall prohibit a specialty contractor from taking and executing a
contract involving the use of two or more crafts
or trades if the performance of the work in the
crafts or trades other than those in which he is
licensed is incidental and suppleme-ntal to the performance of work in the craft for which the specialty contractor is licensed.''
That pursuant to the authority granted by said Sections 58-23-5 (10) and 58-23-9 (C-(2) and (3) ), the administrator of the department of contractors, appointed by
the Department of Business Regulations, had classified
contractors building swimming pools into a classification
requiring a Specialty Contractor's License and that said
classification was made and was effective prior to the
first day of April, 1958. (R. 2, 3, 120) The failure to
hold such a license is admitted by respondent, but he attempts to justify his unlawful and void contract by the
fact that, at the time, respondent held a General BuildSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing Contractor's License defined by Sec. 58-23-9 (b), as
follows:
'' (b)

GENERAL BuiLDING CoNTRACToR's LICENSE.

A general building contractor is a contractor
whose principal contracting business is in connection with any structure built, being built, or to be
built for the support, shelter and enclosure of persons, animals, chattels or movable property of
any kind requiring in its construction the use of
more than two unrelated building trades or crafts
or to do or superintend the whole or any part
thereof, but does not include anyone who merely
furnishes materials or supplies without fabricating them into or consuming them in the performance of the work of the general building
contractor.''
It is immediately apparent that a General Building
Contractor's License is limited to specific structures for a
specific purpose. This is a long cry from the problems involved in planning and building swimming pools which
involve many technical factors, including safety and
sanitation.
In spite of the admitted regulation of the administrator, acting under and pursuant to the authority of the
Department of Business Regulations, the trial court, without any evidence or record, decided that anyone could
build a swimming pool and no specialty license was required. (R 71) The trial court held, in effect, that the
administrator, by and through the Department of Business Regulation, had no basis or authority for the specialty classification. The Court's attention is invited to
the only evidence on this subject:
8
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(Testimony of Mr. Lamb (R. 34), an admitted
expert.)
'' Q. Let me ask you this : Does it take any
necessary or special skills to build a sw1mnnng
pool~

''A. Well, I think so.''
The law ignored by the trial court is succinctly stated
in American J ur., Vol. 42, at page 621 :
''The court has nothing to do with the wisdom of
expediency of the measures adopted by an administrative agency to which the formulation and execution of state policy has been intrusted, and must
not substitute its judgment or notions of expediency and fairness or wisdom for those which have
guided such agency, even where the proof is convincing that a different result would have been
better. These are rna tters left by the legislature
to the administrative 'tribunal appointed by law
and informed by experience.' ''
This court has uniformly followed this. doctrine. See

Utah Labor Relations Board v. Broadway Shoe
Repair Co., 120 Utah 585, 236 P. 2d 1072.
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Com., 116 Utah 443,
211 Pac. 2d 200.
Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Com.,
119 Utah 491, 229 Pac. 2d 675.
Clayton v. Bennett, 3 Utah 2d 531, 298 Pac. 2d
531.
Bowline v. Gries (Cal.), 218 Pac. 2d 806.
Franklin v. Na.t C. Goldstone Agency (Cal.) 204
Pac. 2d 37.
Fraenkel v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav.
Assn., (Cal.) 256 Pac. 2d 569.
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It being admitted and established that respondent
did not have the requisite license, we now look to the result of such failure. In Olsen v. Reese, ------ Utah ______ , 200
Pac. 2d 733, this court said:
''Contracts made by an unlicensed contractor
when in violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public are held to be void and unenforceable. Our statute is so worded as to indicate a legislative intent to protect the citizens from
irresponsible contractors. The statute, while not
comprehensive, provides for a small license fee.
Control over the contractor is given to the Department of Registration. Upon an appropriate
hearing, the department may, for unprofessional
conduct, suspend or cancel the license. Good reputation and integrity are essential to obtaining a
license and the entire object of the statute is protection of the public against fraudulent and illegal
practice, which have always been recognized as a
distinct characteristic of statutes, which are not
mere revenue measures. The statute being enacted for the protection of the public, plaintiff's
written contract is void unless it is competent
and permissible for him to establish that the date
when it was actually executed and delivered was
later than the date of execution shown in the
contract.''
Also, in the case of Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Utah 521
211 Pac. 2d 849:
''Neither the pleadings nor the findings of fact
include any statement that plaintiff nor Empey
was licensed as a contractor by the State of Utah,
as required by Section 79-5a-1, U.C.A. 1943
which reads :
" 'It shall be unla,v"ful for any person, firm, co-

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

partnership, corporation, association, or other
organization, or any combination of any thereof,
to engage in the business or act in the capacity of
contractor within this state without having a license therefor as herein provided, unless such person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association,
or other organization is particularly exempted as
provided in this act. '
''Recently this court has had occasion to pass
upon the necessity of such a license and held, Olsen
v. Reese, Utah 1948, 200 P. 2d 733, that the possession of such a license is a necessary allegation
in the pleadings ; and that such a contract entered
into without a license is void.
"Defendant demurred to plaintiff's complaint
as not stating a cause of action. The demurrer
should have been sustained. Plaintiff, however,
contends that this error in the complaint was not
called to the attention of the lower court, but was
raised for the first time in this court. Quite aside
from the fact that a failure to state a cause of
action is an objection that may be raised at any
time, the findings of fact on their face show the
judgment is void for lack of a finding that plaintiff has such a license, and the testimony in the
case is to the effect that plaintiff did not have a
license.
''Plaintiff contends that Empey as his agent
had a license, but, under plaintiff's theory, Empey
was not the responsible party, the contractor; and
such fact, if true, would not relieve the contractor
from the requirements of the statute.
''We are of the opinion that the case cited
above is decisive of this case. The judgment of
the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded
with directions to the lower court to dismiss the
action.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Only a year a.go, this court in the case of Chase v.
Morgarn, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 Pa.c. 2d 1019, held that an
unlicensed real estate broker was not entitled to recover,
even though a Justice (concurring) asserted that ''As to
good conscience, this case was disturbing.''

PoiNT

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Immediately upon the filing of the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law appellant moved to amend and
supplement the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(R. 106-107) The motion to amend was based upon the
initial admission that the respondent at the time of the
contracting held only a general builders' contractor's license. The court refused to incorporate this material allegation in its findings of fact. Appellant further moved the
making of additional findings of fact as follows:
"(a) That on or about April 1, 1958, the administrator acting under the direction and supervision of Commission of Business Regulation, and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-23-5 (10),
Laws of Utah 1957, had classified contractors
building swimming pools into a specialty classifiac.tion of contractors requiring a specialty contractors license. That such classification "~as made
and \vas effectiv·e prior to the first day of ..L:\._pril,
1958.
''(b) That on or before the 1st day of April,
1958, the plaintiff \vas engaged in the business of
planning and building s\-rimming pools.
12
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'' (c) That before April1, 1958, the defendant
was contacted by one Mr. Murdock, who represented that he was a sales agent for Crystal Pools,
Inc., and the defendant and Murdock negotiated
concerning the design and construction of a commercial pool. That on or about April 1, 1958, the
defendant Locke did sign the purported agreement
as shown by Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's
complaint.
'' (d) That on or about April 1, 1958, no specialty contractors' license had been issued to
plaintiff.
'' (e) That on or about April 1, 1958, there
was no such corporation in existence by the name
of Crystal Pools, Inc.
"(f) That on or about April 1, 1958, no contractor's license of any kind had been issued to any
such entity by the name of Crystal Pools, Inc.,
nor had any contractor's license of any kind been
issued in the name of Crystal Pools, Inc.
"(g) That on or about April1, 1958, the plaintiff had filed no affidavit with the County Clerk of
Salt Lake County of doing business under an assumed name." (R. 106-107)
This was refused. These were facts which were the
subject of judicial admission in this case, which has heretofore been discussed in the statement of facts and were
material to a decision by the trial court.

PoiNT

V.

RESPONDENT WAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER
AN ASSUMED NAME AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, UTAH CODE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ANNOTATED 1953 AND RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED
CONTRACT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
The respondent was doing business under an assumed
name and failed to comply with the provisions of Section
42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and respondent's
alleged contract is unenforceable.
Section 42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as
follows:
''Affidavit of assumed and of true name--Filing. - No person or persons shall carry on or
conduct or tra,nsact business in this state under an
as~umed name, or under any designation, name
or style, corporate, partnership or otherwise, other
than the real name or names of the individual or
individuals conducting or transacting such business, unless such person or persons shall file in
the office of the county clerk of the county in which
the principal place of business is, or is to be, located, an affidavit setting forth the name under
which such business is, or is to be, conducted or
transacted, and the true full name or names of the
person or persons owning, conducting or transacting the same, the location of the principal place of
business, with the postoffice address or addresses
of such person or persons. Such affidavit shall be
executed by the person or persons so conducting or
intending to conduct such business.'' (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellant is familiar 'vith the fact that the majority
view entertained by the courts is that the legislature did
not intend to impose a penalty on the offender of refusing
him relief on contracts or transactions without compliance. However, these general text statements are made
without reference to the language of the statutes of the
14
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various states. The language of the Utah statute is extremerly forceable and demanding - ''No person shall
carry on or conduct business * * *."
This Court apparently had reservations on this subject. In the case of Green v. Nelson, 120 Utah 155, 232
Pac. 2d 776, Justice Wolfe, who, after holding the statute
inapplicable for other reasons, stated:
"Holding as we do that section 58-2-1, U. C. A.
1943, has no application to a person doing business in this state under an assumed name but having no place of business here, it is unnecessary for
us to here express any opinion whether the failure
to comply with that section, when applicable, renders a contract made by a partnership in its assumed name unenforceable in the courts of this
state.''
This is now the case where this Court should squarely
face the language and demands of the Legislature in a
definite opinion.
PoiNT

VI.

AS THE CASE RESTED RESPONDENT FAILED
TO PROVE ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED THE
CONTRACT WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AS AN
AGENT FOR A NON-EXISTENT PRINCIPAL.

An examination of Exhibit P-1 shows that the contract was made on behalf of Crystal Pools, Inc., and was
executed in a representative capacity by respondent, i. e.,
CRYSTAL POOLS, INC.
By J. Lowell Platt
N arne and Title
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The final paragraph of Exhibit P-1 states: ''This
contract is not binding upon Crystal Pools, Inc., until the
original is accepted in writing by an officer or general
manager thereof.'' Appellant is conscious of the fact
that the respondent testified that Mr. Locks knew that it
was not incorporated for the reason that he had informed
Mr. Locke. (R. 19) There was no evidence, however, as
to when and under what circumstances this information
was given to Mr. Locke. The interesting factor is that
the trial judge paid no attention to this evidence and
erroneously held that Platt would have been bound on
the contract because he was an agent for a non-existent
principal, and therefore Locke was bound, and that Locke
could not have relied upon a corporation not in existence
because it had no reputation and had only been in existence in contemplation of mind for two months or less
(R. 71-72). The trial court made no finding that Locke was
informed of the non-existence of the corporation prior to
the execution of the contract.
Section 369 of Restatement of the Law of Agency,
Second, reads as follows : ·
''AGENT

WHo HAs

AcTED WITHOUT AuTHORITY

- A person who, without power to do so, purports
to bind a disclosed or partially disclosed principal
as a party to a contract cannot, eYen though he is
a party thereto and offers to perform it, maintain
an action thereon against the other party to it,
unless the purported principal ratifies it.''

It appears to appellant that if an agent without authority makes a contract with a disclosed principal, and
16
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nence he cannot maintain an action thereon without ratification, that it necessarily follows that an agent who purports to make a contract on behalf of a non-e:xistent principal can be in no better position. The Court will note
that Exhibit P-1 is an unambiguous, integrated contract. Under the circumstances presented in this case the
respondent is now estopped from denying the existence of
''Crystal Pools,'' Inc.,'' which he dealt with as a corporation.
Cavaness v. General Corporation, (Tex.) 272 S.W.
2d 595, 602, affirmed, 283 S.W. 2d 33.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court ignored the previous
announcements of this court concerning the necessity of
holding appropri'ate license when the public interest is
involved, and the court arbitrarily substituted its judgment for an administrative agency. The law is well founded in the State of Utah on the subjects involved, and
appellant urges that such prior announcements cannot be
disregarded.
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in the
various rulings and acts set forth under the points herein
presented and argued.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
Attorneys for Appellant
307 Utah Oil Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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